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ABSTRACT 
Rene Descartes is considered by many philosophers of ethics as the 
main figure of the view that animals do not feel pain, so we can inflict pain to 
them by killing, eating and experimenting. However, in this paper, I will give an 
interpretation of Descartes’ arguments concerning this issue and will conclude 
that on the contrary to the orthodox view, he gives credit to the idea that animals 
do feel pain. By means of this, this paper is going to deal with the issue of 
natural automaton, ‘language argument’ and the mind-body issue concerning 
sensations. Ultimately, I will show that, according to Descartes animals have 
sensations and they feel pain. 
Key Words: Descartes, Animal Rights, Automaton, Mind-Body, and 
Dualism.  
 
(Descartes’a Göre Hayvanlarda Acı Hissi) 
 
ÖZET 
Rene Descartes’in, ahlak felsefesi alanındaki birçok felsefeci tarafından 
hayvanların acı hissetmediğini ve dolayısıyla da öldürülebilir, yenilebilir ve 
üzerlerinde deney yapılabilir olduğunu iddia ettiği görüşü kabul edilmektedir. 
Bu makalede Descartes’in bu iddia ile ilgili argümanlarını değerlendirip, ortaya 
konulan görüşün aksine bu argümanlarla Descartes’in hayvanların acı 
hissetmediği sonucuna ulaşmadığını ortaya koyacağım. Bu amaçla, bu makale 
‘doğal otomaton’, ‘dil argümanı’ ve duyumlarla ilgili zihin-beden problemi 
sorunlarıyla ilgilenecektir. Sonuç olarak, Descartes’e göre hayvanların 
duyumları olduğunu ve acı çekebildiklerini iddia edeceğim.    
Anahtar Kelimeler: Descartes, Hayvan Hakları, Otomaton, Zihin-
Beden, ve İkicilik.  
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Introduction 
 
When we see a dog yowling on the street, we immediately attribute a 
pain state to the dog and easily say that the dog is in pain. Since this attribution is 
very intuitive and obvious to us, claims such as “animals are mere automatons” 
or “animals don’t feel pain” are both counter-intuitive and appalling to our 
understanding in our Zeitgeist. However, in 17
th
 Century Europe, such claims 
were appealing for certain reasons. The issue that I will consider in this paper is 
Rene Descartes’ account for the feelings of animals and especially the feeling of 
pain. According to some philosophers
1
, Descartes claims that animals are like 
automatons and thus animals are without any feeling at all. In this paper, I will 
show that this is a wrong interpretation of Descartes’ account of animal sensation 
and feeling. What I will do instead is to show the incorrectness of this 
interpretation by giving an adequate interpretation, by which I will claim, first, 
that Descartes’ explanation of the physiology of the human body does not 
involve anything depending on mind and for Descartes both the animal and the 
human body are natural automaton. Second, for Descartes, having no language 
does not indicate having no feelings or sensations. Finally, I will claim that, for 
Descartes, soul is not a necessary condition to have sensations and feelings. 
Ultimately, by virtue of these interpretations, I will conclude that animals can 
feel or have sensations by being mere natural automaton.  
 
Descartes’ Animals: Biological Automata 
 
The aim of this section is to show that, first, according to Descartes the 
analogy between automatons and animals does not directly entail the claim that 
animals do not feel pain, and second, the distinction between sensation (sensus) 
and pain (affectus) plays an important role both in Descartes’ metaphysics and in 
physiology. Thus, I will conclude in this section that Descartes does not say that 
animals are without any pain but the pain state of an animal is different from the 
pain state of a man. In order to support the thesis of this section, let us now see 
what Descartes really says about animals throughout in his writings. 
In order to understand Descartes’ concern with the analogy between 
automatons and animals we need to consider, first, one of Descartes’ most 
important contributions to intellectual history, namely, the claim that animal 
body is a machine and his elimination of the soul from the explanations of the 
functions of the animal body in general. In Discourse of Method Part V he says 
that the animal body, “As a machine which, having been made by the hand of 
God, is incomparable better ordered . . . than any of those … invented by human 
beings”2. Here Descartes clearly holds the idea that animal as machines, cannot 
                                                        
1 For the discussions see. T. Regan and P. Singer (eds.). Animal Rights and Human 
Obligations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976). A. Boyce Gibson, The 
Philosophy of Descartes (London: Methuen, 1932), p. 214. Paola Cavalieri. The Animal 
Debate: A Reexamination. In Singer, 2006, pp. 54-69. Peter Singer. Animal Liberation. 
(New York: Avon, 1975) 
2 AT VI 56, CSM I 139. ‘CSM’ = J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (editors 
and translators), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vols. I. and II. (Cambridge: 
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be comparable with automaton (machines invented by human beings) in 
terms of their physiology. It is at least because God is infinitely more powerful 
than human beings and its creation, from this self-evident premise, should be 
better than the creation of the hand of human kind. Then, the idea that animals 
are machines reflects Descartes’ general position in his account of physiology. 
Accordingly, all animal behavior can be explained by physiological laws and 
nothing miraculous can be seen in the animal body. Thus, all these animal 
behavior and the physiological laws can be derived from the mathematical 
principles. This is explicit when he says, “all the motions of animals originate 
from the corporeal and mechanical principle”3. 
From all of these, we can only see that animal body for Descartes is a 
machine, which can be explained by mere physiological laws and mathematical 
principles. However, we need to see whether Descartes considers human body as 
an animal body as well, or he solely talks about animals, while excluding 
humans. Descartes is explicit on this issue. In his conversation with Burman he 
says, “God made our body like a machine, and he wanted it to function like a 
universal instrument, which would always operate in the same way in 
accordance with its own laws.”4 The machine analogy is also present here, but it 
is still confusing to decide whether the laws that Descartes refers cover only the 
physiological laws of the body or something more is included in order to 
emphasize the universality claim. I think this place is where Descartes is 
confusing and inadequate. In the latter sentences of the conversation Descartes 
talks about the soul, which is informed by the body when the body is in good 
health or in bad health, and this gives awareness to the soul about the body. 
However, as we know (and I will come to it later) Descartes does not attribute 
soul to animals. So here, I think, we can only say that the universality claim is 
unique to the humans because it requires a kind of relation between the soul and 
the body and this relation produces awareness for the soul to be informed by the 
body.  
Postponing the discussion of the soul for a while, up to that point we 
can be clear about the idea that animals are just like machines and, secondly, 
they are natural automaton. This latter claim is explicit in Descartes’ letter to 
More. He says, “It seems reasonable since art copies nature, and man can make 
various automata which move without thought, that nature should produce its 
own automata much more splendid than the artificial once. These natural 
automata are the animals.”5 As we see here, Descartes considers animals as 
natural automata. This is very important. In the last paragraph the claim that the 
machine analogy works for both humans and animals was not adequately 
supported. However, his use of “natural automata” leads us to another passage 
                                                                                                                             
Cambridge University Press 1984). ‘AT’ = Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (eds.), 
Ouvres de Descartes (Paris: Vrin/CNRS 1966-76). ‘CSMK’ = J. Cottingham, R. 
Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny (editors and translators): The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes Vol. III. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991). For the 
rest of the paper these abbreviations will be used in order to refer to those books. 
3 Letter to More of 5 February 1649, AT V 276, CSMK 365. 
4 AT 5 163-4, CSMK 346; Cf. Cottingham (ed.), Descartes’s Conversation with Burman, 
p. 29 
5 AT V 277, CSMK 366 
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where Descartes considers the human body as a natural automaton as well. 
He describes the human body in the beginning of Man by appealing to the same 
analogy: 
We see clocks [des horloges], artificial fountains, mills, and 
other such machines, which, although only man-made, have the 
power to move of their own accord in many different ways. But I am 
supposing this machine to be made by the hands of God, and so I 
think you may reasonably think it capable of a greater variety of 
movements than I could possibly imagine in it, and of exhibiting 
more artistry than I could possibly ascribe to it.
6
 
I think, all these concerns about the animal body (including human 
body) show that he wants to explain its functions and characteristics by 
appealing only to the material nature (res extensia) and excluding the use of soul 
in such explanations. So, what can we infer from this first claim about the 
animals; that animals are natural automaton? I think the general inclination that 
flows in discussions about this claim is an unfortunate misunderstanding. This 
general attempt is to conclude that Descartes’ meaning of natural automata 
yields to say that animals do not feel pain. However, I think this conclusion 
cannot be drawn from none of Descartes’ arguments related to the machine 
analogy. It seems to me that this consideration is influenced by an intuition about 
the informal characteristics of the machines and the automatons. If we look at 
automaton or machines in general we would not attribute any pain state. This is 
because we think that such states require highly complex mental capabilities. 
However, ‘automaton’ does not reflect any such meaning from its definition. 
Cottingham points out this in Cartesian Reflections
7
: 
But the inference from ‘X is an automaton’ to ‘X is 
incapable of feeling’ is a mistaken one. Webster’s8 dictionary gives 
the primary meaning of ‘automaton’ as simply ‘a machine that is 
relatively self-operating’; and neither this nor the subsidiary 
meaning (‘creature who acts in a mechanical fashion’) 
automatically implies the absence of feeling. 
To conclude the discussion of the automaton and animals as mere 
natural automata, it seems quite clear to me that Descartes does not claim that 
animals do not feel pain because of being natural automata. This is an important 
point and should be elaborated a bit more here. If the former is the case, then we 
have two possible ways to follow. First of all, it may be the case that being 
automaton does not exclude having a pain state and we can say that feeling pain 
is not merely an immaterial attribution that comes directly from the soul. 
Secondly, it might also be the case that, animals do not feel pain, but this is 
because of some other reason than the former one. However, Descartes does not 
issue such reason. In this case, because humans are also natural automata having 
the pain state might be the result of both the body and the soul or only the body; 
                                                        
6 AT XI 120, CSM I 99 
7 Cottingham, John. Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes’s Philosophy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 180. 
8 In Cottingham 2008: Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springﬁeld, Mass.: 
Merriam, 1963) 
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hence the first reason seems more reasonable to accept. So, in the 
following sections I will specify Descartes’ position on this issue. Now, let us 
continue with another argument related to our issue; namely the language 
argument. 
 
Dogs are Barking, Men are Talking 
 
So far we have seen that for Descartes the mere distinction between an 
automaton and a natural machine, which is an animal, lies on the word ‘natural’ 
and this naturalness is because of the reason that animals are products of God, 
whereas automaton are produced by man. Then, the question to answer here is 
what makes an animal a natural machine and how to distinguish them from men. 
To start answering this we can first look at the Meditations, where Descartes 
discredits self-movement as a characteristic attributed to the soul only. He says, 
“according to my judgment, the power of self-movement, like the power of 
sensation or of thought, was quite foreign to the nature of body; indeed, it was a 
source of wonder to me that certain bodies were found to contain faculties of this 
kind”9. This kind of bodies that Descartes refers is indeed automaton. In this 
case, self-movement cannot be the distinguishing feature of the natural 
machines.  
Considering this realization of Descartes, we can see this in Discourse 
Part V, where Descartes considers language as a distinguishing feature of man 
contrasting with both automaton and other animals. He says:  
The first is that they could never use words, or put 
together other signs, as we do in order to declare our thoughts to 
others. For we can certainly conceive of a machine so constructed 
that it utters words, and even utters words, which correspond to 
bodily actions casing a change in its organs. But it is not 
conceivable that such a machine should produce different 
arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful 
answer to whatever is said in its presence, as the dullest of men can 
do
10
. 
Three things are important in this passage. First, Descartes considers 
that automata and animals lack of the ability to express thought by 
communication. This is clear in the first sentence. So we can say that for 
Descartes, thought expression by communication (words or signs) is one of the 
unique capabilities of humans. Secondly, he also holds the idea that 
communication can only be possible if and only if utterances are meaningful. 
Finally, and I think most importantly, he thinks that all men including the dullest 
of all have this ability as well
11
. Ultimately if we want to state the 
                                                        
9 AT VII 26, CSM II 18 
10 Discourse, Part V AT VI 56-7, CSM I 140 
11 Two important remarks can be made here. First, Descartes is probably unaware in his 
time that autism is the disability to communicate with other people. In this case, even he 
holds that all humans have the ability to communicate; simply autistic people do not have 
this ability. In this case, in an anachronistic framework one can blame this criterion of 
language by considering the autistic people. Secondly, I think the common name for this 
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communication criterion explicitly (bypassing the part of dullest man), this 
will be the following: One of the unique characteristics of man is to produce 
meaningful speech in order to express his thought and to respond to other’s 
speech accordingly. This capacity of communication shows for Descartes that it 
is not a mere bodily capacity but it is a mental capacity, which is a conduct of 
reason and the rational soul. This is explicit in his letter to More: “Speech is the 
only sure sign of thought hidden in the body”12. Of course, because Descartes is 
so explicit on the mental aspect of speech, this leads many philosophers to 
conclude that animals cannot feel as well as they think or talk.  
However, I think this is again a wrong interpretation. At the face value 
of the criterion it seems that in order to talk, one need a rational soul but this is a 
necessary condition of speech and this is, I think, indeed true for Descartes. 
However, my worry is due to the idea that considering animals incapable of talk 
and having no mind entails that they do not feel as well. Here what we need to 
examine is Descartes’ account of feeling. Unfortunately, this is not an easy task 
to cope with in Descartes’ writings. However, briefly, I will try to explain it. 
To start, I think, it seems true in many places that Descartes holds the 
idea that feeling pain is a ‘special or confusing mode of thinking’. In addition to 
this, again in many places, he explicitly says that this special mode is a product 
of the intermingling of the mind and the body. Thus, in order to feel pain both 
the mind and the body are needed. In Principles of Philosophy he says:  
But we also experience within ourselves certain other 
things which must not be referred either to the mind alone or to the 
body alone. There arise, as will be made clear later on, in the 
appropriate place, from the close and intimate union of our mind 
with the body. … This list includes … all the sensations, such as 
those of pain, pleasure, light, colours, sounds, smells, tastes … 13 
So here it is explicit that pain is a kind of sensation, which can be 
experienced by mind-body. In this paper, I will not deal with the issue of 
Cartesian Trialism, but it is important for our purpose to have a clear idea about 
the situation of pain. In this case, as Katalin Farkas pinpoints, the problem here 
is derived from the union of mind and body
14
. So, how should we understand this 
union of mind and body? 
Descartes has a clear answer for this question in the 6
th
 Meditation. He 
thinks that the experience of feeling of pain can be adequate if they are the 
confused modes of thinking and mere confused sensations: 
If this were not so I who am nothing but a thinking thing 
would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive 
the damage purely by intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if 
anything in his ship is broken. Similarly, when the body needed 
                                                                                                                             
criterion “language argument” is misleading. I think Descartes only considers language in 
use of communication and nothing else. Thus, for instance logic, algebra, etc, cannot be in 
the domain of this criterion. 
12 Letter to More of 5 February 1649, AT V 278, CSMK 366 
13 AT VIIIA 23, CSM I 208-9 
14 Farkas, Katalin. “The Unity of Descartes’s Thought”, History of Philosophy Quarterly 
22/1 (January 2005) pp. 17-30. 
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food or drink, I should have an explicit understanding of the fact, 
instead of having confused sensations of hunger and thirst. For 
these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on, are nothing but 
confused modes of thinking which arise from the union and as it 
were intermingling of the mind with the body.
15
  
In this passage, we can see a clear distinction between feeling (affectus) 
the pain and sensing (sensus) the pain. What we can infer from this passage is, 
for Descartes, that a complete feeling of pain requires the union of mind and 
body and in the case of mere body any such feelings cannot be obtained. What is 
obtained in that case is just a bodily realization of the material state of the pain, 
hunger, etc. If this is the case, then we are one step behind the accurate 
understanding of Descartes’ concern of the feeling of pain. What is missing here 
is the unclear explanation of this accurate feeling of pain and its deviation from 
the sensation of pain. In order to approach to this question another passage from 
Principles is needed: 
The result of these movements being set up in the brain by 
the nerves is that the soul or mind that is closely joined to the brain 
is affected in various ways, corresponding to various different sorts 
of movements. And the various different states of mind, or 
thoughts, which are the immediate result of these movements are 
called sensory perceptions, or in ordinary speech, sensations.
16
 
Here Descartes, again, emphasizes the need for the union of mind and 
body for the having of sensations. According to this passage, we can understand 
that body (different sorts of movements in the brain) is the necessary condition 
of these immediate thoughts in the mind. If we combine this to the inference that 
I have made in the previous passage, then we can say that these movements 
themselves can cause a confused sensation, but this confused mode is not 
sufficient alone to have the awareness of that sensation. So it seems to me that 
this forces us to think that there are two kinds of accounts for sensation one of 
which is an incomplete and the other of which is a complete mode of sensation.  
The last thing concerning this issue is to see what is additional in the 
case of full sensation or feeling, which is lacking in the case of bodily sensation. 
Cottingham points out the failure that interpreting ‘thinking’ as simply 
‘experiencing’. According to him, for Descartes thinking (cogitatio) involves 
more than experiencing. He refers to Descartes by saying, “If understood as de 
visione (of vision) it is not a good premise for inferring one’s existence; but if 
understood ‘concerning the actual sense or awareness of seeing’ it is quite 
certain, since it is in this case referred to the mind which alone feels or thinks it 
sees”17. The contribution of mind to sensation and feeling is the awareness of 
seeing and feeling. So, as Cottingham concludes, thinking does not include 
sensation and feeling but it is the awareness of them. This is called the 
conscientia, which is ‘to be aware is to think and to reflect on one’s thought’18. 
Ultimately, we can conclude that the union of mind and body is not the 
                                                        
15 AT VII 8 I, CSM II 56 
16 AT VIIIA 316, CSM I 280 
17 Cottingham, 2008, p. 168 (see footnote 22 in the text for references to the quoted parts) 
18 Conversation with Burman, AT V 149, CSMK 333 
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necessary condition to feel pain but the body is the necessary condition of 
it. However, body alone cannot be the sufficient condition to feel pain fully but it 
can be sufficient to have a ‘confused’ sense of feeling.  
In order to support this claim a bit more, two important passages can 
help us to see some positive evidences for my claim. In his letter to Newcastle 
Descartes mentions how this feeling without any thought involvement is 
possible. He says, “If you teach a magpie to say good-day to its mistress when it 
sees her coming, all you can possibly have done is to make the emitting of this 
word the expression of one of its feelings. For instance it will be an expression of 
the hope of eating.”19 It is clear in this passage that Descartes attributes feelings 
to animals. Furthermore, Descartes also clearly attributes sensation to animals as 
well and also remarks on the ethical implications of his account concerning 
animals. He says:  
Please note that I am speaking of thought, and not of life 
or sensation. I do not deny life to animals, since I regard it as 
consisting simply in the heat of the heart; and I do not even deny 
sensation, in so far as it depends on a bodily organ. Thus my 
opinion is not so much cruel to animals as indulgent to human 
beings — at least to those who are not given to the superstitions of 
Pythagoras — since it absolves them from the suspicion of crime 
when they eat or kill animals
20
. 
I think it is now certainly clear that, for Descartes, animals feel pain. 
However, this passage brings another discussion. Descartes here explicitly 
suggests that his account allows killing and eating animals. Peter Singer uses this 
phrase in order to show the wrongness of Descartes’ account. He emphasizes: 
Some philosophers, including Descartes, have thought so 
important that while humans can tell each other about their 
experience of pain in great detail, other animals cannot … But as 
Bentham pointed out long ago, the ability to use language is not 
relevant to the question of how a being ought to be treated
21
. 
As I have showed in this section –specifically, putting Descartes in this 
sanction is a misleading interpretation. So, contrary to what Singer says, in my 
opinion this is not what Descartes tells us in the language argument.  
Summing up what I have said in this section, I will emphasize two 
crucial steps of my claim that having no mind does not mean having no feelings. 
Firstly, I have showed that the language argument concludes that animals have 
no mind and no thinking. Secondly, I have claimed that, for Descartes, thinking 
does not include full account of feeling and sensation. Instead, Descartes claims 
that union of mind and body can enable full sensation and feeling. In this case, 
body can enable a confused sense of feeling and sensation but these feelings and 
senses are lack of self-awareness of the agent, which entails an adequate 
understanding of the felt and sensed state of the body. However, the crucial 
claim that I have made here is that in order to feel something mind is not a 
                                                        
19 AT IV 574, CSMK 303 (See also the letter to More 5 Februrary 1649 for a similar 
explanation.) 
20 AT V 278, CSMK 366 
21 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 14 
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necessary condition and without mind or a rational soul the body can have 
feelings. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have claimed that neither the language argument, nor the 
account of natural automata entails the claim that animals do not feel pain. I 
claimed that for Descartes animals do feel pain but their feeling of pain is a mere 
confused sensation and by having no mind animals cannot be aware of their 
pain-states. I have supported this claim by arguing (1) both animals and humans 
are natural automata and mind plays no role in explaining both the human and 
the animal body as natural machines; and (2) having a mind is not the ultimate 
cause of feelings, but it provides self-awareness of these sensations. So this 
conclusion provides objections to the common interpretation, which holds these 
two accounts as sufficient textual evidence to conclude that Descartes is one of 
the first antagonists of animal rights. For the orthodox reading because animals 
are natural machines and have no mind, they cannot have feelings as well. 
However, this condition only shows that they cannot be aware of what they feel. 
Feeling and the awareness of feeling are two different things. 
However, one can still think that even in my interpretation the lack of 
awareness of the pain-state in animals provides us reasons to say that we have no 
duty towards animals. This attempt would be a far cry from being one of 
Descartes’ positions. Descartes never makes this conclusion and hence cannot be 
accused of what he never said before. I think this common mistake relies on the 
intuition that to be a moral agent one needs intentionality. However, at least in 
these arguments, Descartes never exposes his account of the relation between 
intentionality and ethics. It is at least unclear whether he accepts this requirement 
of intentionality or not. Hence, an independent inquiry concerning this issue 
might bring out Descartes’ full account of animal rights. Until then, Descartes is 
innocent.      
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